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Part 7

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

The committee met in open session pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Nunn, and Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; and Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Louis W. Arny III, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Bruce D. Porter, and James C. Smith, professioal staff members; Drew A. Harker, research assistant; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, Jacquie S. O'Grady, and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Guy Copeland, assistant to Senator Warner; Ron Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; John Roddy, assistant to Senator East; Patrick McKim, assistant to Senator Wilson; Frank Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; and Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The purpose of our hearing this morning is to continue our series of hearings on the overall national security decisionmaking process.

Today we will hear from three of our operational commanders—Gen. Bernie Rogers, in his role as Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command; Adm. Wes McDonald, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command; and Gen. Paul Gorman, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

I know these are busy times for each of you and I appreciate your adjusting your own schedules so you can be here today.

In my view, recent events demonstrate the need to pursue a rigorous review of our defense organization and decisionmaking process.

I am not suggesting that we will ultimately recommend sweeping changes to the Defense Establishment; however, anytime American service personnel lose their lives in combat, the American people must be satisfied that the decisions leading to that loss of life were sound decisions—both militarily and in terms of our broader national security interests.

Today we are focusing on the Unified and Specified Commands and those commanders directly accountable to the Secretary of Defense for the employment of our forces. This is a particularly opportune time to hear from General Rogers, given his responsibility for our presence in Lebanon, and from Admiral McDonald, since he is the operational commander responsible for our military action in Grenada.

I don't want to limit your remarks to only issues related to the Unified and Specified Commands. I am sure all of you have views regarding operations of the JCS, the military departments or the Defense Department that would be of value to the committee.

I am going to suggest, although it is not for the specific reasons for the hearing, that Admiral McDonald give us a brief rundown on the current military situation in Grenada during the course of his presentation.

Before we proceed, let me yield to Senator Nunn for any comments he may have.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to have our witnesses this morning.

I want to set the record straight with respect to an article in the New York Times. The article says I asserted a number of critical points about the operation in Grenada. I just want to make a brief comment on that.

Yesterday's hearing record will clearly be the best evidence of what was said, but I stated from the very beginning that I felt the operation was successful and that we should review it from the point of view of command and control, from the point of view and perspective of having been a successful operation.

I suggested that the staff needed to look into that, later on in the afternoon, from that perspective.

I also said there were a number of questions that should be looked into and that one of the questions that I wanted to look into was the question of unity of command because we have had that question raised in other situations like the rescue mission in Iran, and so forth. I felt it would be very helpful to compare those two operations.

I also said that I was very concerned about the lack of adequate intelligence and the article correctly reflected that. I think we will want to get into that in this committee and in the Intelligence Committee.

So, Mr. Chairman, I do believe we ought to look at Grenada in detail. I know we will look at it this morning. I know there are a number of legitimate questions that should be asked. Again, I want to make it clear that I view that as a successful operation.

I also support from the very outset the President's decision to make that commitment to rescue Americans.

I want to put that article in the right context. Those were questions rather than assertions. I will continue to ask questions, but I will reserve my assertions and conclusions for a later date.

Chairman TOWER. We are always misunderstood and misquoted.

General Rogers, why don't you proceed first. Then we will hear from Admiral McDonald followed by General Gorman.

If you have anything prepared or any supporting document you want inserted in the record, they can be included in full. You can proceed in any way you see fit.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to present some thoughts as to what I think should be done, but to do that I know risks seeming to present a tutorial on how the Government provides for national security. So, if you will, bear with me as I go through some givens and variables in the equation.

Obviously, we have a set of national security arrangements which play a part in pursuing our overall national interest and under them come a national military program to provide deterrence and war-fighting capability to insure our national security arrangements.

In defining and implementing the military side of our arrangements there are some constant factors—the givens—which we must keep in mind.

The first is the Commander in Chief of our forces is the President and serving him are the NSC and NSC staff and the Office of Management and Budget.

Second, Congress has the power to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a Navy.

Third, there are four separate services with independent roles and missions. The services are responsible for manning, equipping, training, and sustaining of the forces.

Another given is that I believe war fighting will be a joint effort and a coalition effort and, therefore, we have a Unified Command plan which delineates areas and designates the forces for those areas.

Someone must be in charge of pulling everything together. That is the Secretary of Defense.

I think another given is that resources in peacetime for security arrangements will never be unconstrained.

Now, how to proceed in order to support security arrangements and the military program. I want to talk about some of the variables in the equation.

First, resource guidance is provided by the Office of Management and Budget, security arrangements clarified and defined by the National Security Council and its staff, further refined by the Secretary of Defense in what we call the defense guidance which establishes goals, objectives and policy for the military and guidelines for military capability.

The services then formulate the programs to meet the defense guidance and the sum of those programs equals our projected defense capability.

This is then reviewed by the Defense Resources Board to insure that what the services are doing is within guidance and within the resource constraints.

There are tradeoffs that have to be made to insure balance between military capability and cost. The service programs are also reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish the level of risk. The approved DOD program is submitted to Congress which plays a key role, as the controller of the purse strings, as to how we organize our defenses.

Now, to me a kev DOD function is to insure the balance between the views of the services and the cross-service or joint views.

The service views are well represented in the programing and budgeting process and are formalized and modified by the service chiefs and the service Secretaries.

The cross-service or joint views have a smaller constituency and limited formality of expression in the current system.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Washington-based uniformed spokesman for cross-service views and for coalition war-fighting capabilities.

The CINCs as the users of the forces speak from a cross-service view. But our avenue is not a formal one.

There has been a major improvement under the current administration. The CINCs appear before the Defense Resources Board two or three times a year. Further, we have an opportunity in our quarterly reports to the Secretary of Defense to raise any issues that we think need to be addressed by the Defense Department.

We also maintain a constant correspondence, most of us, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The CINCs' appearance before the Defense Resources Board is at the sufferance of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Yet cross-service views are essential to trade off decisions on program recommendations of the services. Those cross-service views are also essential in the writing of strategy and development of policy and doctrine.

So, the central question in my mind, Mr. Chairman, as a CINC, is how to insure cross-service views are sufficiently represented. I believe that certain actions are required.

First, placing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command to insure he is the peacetime spokesman of the CINCs on cross-service issues, on policy, strategy, the programing and budgeting process. That is also where he belongs in time of war, in my opinion.

Second, making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a member of the National Security Council so as to insure that security arrangements are defined with cross-service and coalition war-fighting needs in mind.

Third, having a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure the presence in Washington at all times of a cross-service spokesman. Further, from my experience as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or as the Chief of Staff, I think the Chairman needs a Deputy. Also having sat outside the Chairman's door for 4 years, 1962 to 1966. as executive officer for two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, it became very obvious to me that we need a permanent Deputy Chair-

man. As a Chief of Staff, it is very difficult to continually keep read into the Chairman's business, even though the Chiefs have now adopted a 3-month rotation system whereby a single Chief for 3 months will represent the Chairman whenever he is gone. The Chairman is a cross-service spokesman, not the service chief. When the Chairman is not there, we need, I think, a Deputy to the Chairman who is a cross-service spokesman.

A fourth action I would suggest be taken is removing restrictions on the size and tenure of the Joint Staff so that the Chairman has an adequate and appropriate staff to form the cross-service views.

My fifth action would be to insure that the interface of the CINCs with the Defense Resources Board be formalized. That can be done within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I don't think we need legislative action on that, but it can be done within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Those are the five actions which I think are necessary in order to meet what I believe to be the key to the security arrangements of this country and that is to insure that the cross-service views, and the coalition war-fighting views as well are injected into the equation at the point where they must be.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Rogers.

Admiral McDonald?

STATEMENT OF ADM. WESLEY L. McDONALD, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Admiral MCDONALD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to offer my thoughts on the role of the unified commander in the organization and decisionmaking process of the Department of Defense.

I have not submitted a written statement, but would like to make some brief remarks.

I have been Commander in Chief, Atlantic, for just over a year. As you know, my area of responsibility includes the North and South Atlantic Oceans, that part of the Pacific Ocean which borders on Central and South America, the Barents, Greenland and Norwegian Seas, and much of the Arctic Ocean including the area contiguous to the Soviet northern fleet bases.

My primary duty is to provide for optimum effectiveness of my forces in combat operations and to provide for the projection of power to support, and advance national policies.

In my year as Commander in Chief, Atlantic, I have been personally involved in the planning and conduct of major joint exercises and the planning for joint contingency operations. The current organization and process has been effective, and I believe serves the Nation well.

The operation in Grenada is a classic example of how well the joint planning system works. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine forces were involved, and the operation was fully coordinated with the commands which provided those forces, and also with the Strategic Air Command, Military Airlift Command, U.S. Readiness Command, and other supporting commanders.

All this detailed planning was done in less than a week. Without an effective system in place, it could not have been accomplished.

I work closely with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, and have direct access to the Secretary of Defense.

As my own naval component commander, CINCLANTFLT, I interface directly with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in obtaining the support required for the training and equipping of my fleet—the ships, the aircraft, and the marines—and I am confident that my Air Force and Army component commanders enjoy the same direct access to their service chiefs.

As a unified commander, I can communicate with all the service chiefs on uniservice matters. Looking at the command relationships with my subordinate commanders, I can honestly say that I am satisfied. If I were not, I would already have taken steps to change those relationships which it is my responsibility to do.

On the question of the current Unified and Specified Command structure, I would point out that the Unified Command plan is a dynamic plan and we review it every 2 years. Changes in the worldwide political, economic, and military environment may cause us to reevaluate the command structure, and we do so regularly.

Resource allocation is another area where the unified and specified commanders take an active role. The CINCs involvement in the planning, programing, and budgeting system has increased markedly in the past 2 or 3 years, and I have ample opportunity to make direct input to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretary of Defense on the major planning and programing documents.

In addition to making recommendations on the Unified Command plan, as I mentioned earlier, we also make recommendations on other major documents such as the joint strategic capabilities plan, the joint strategic planning document, and the defense guidance.

Just yesterday, four of us, and later today, the remainder of the unified and specified commanders will have made their personal recommendations to the Defense Resources Board on the fiscal year 1986 defense guidance.

There is a continuous dialog between my staff, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on all issues affecting resource allocation within my command.

I additionally send regular reports directly to the Secretary of Defense advising him of my major concerns.

It is my sincere belief that the present organization works well in supporting me, and affording me the required flexibility to discharge my duties as a unified commander. The organization is not rigid, and with enlightened leadership, it has been demonstrated that when changes are required, they can be made within the existing structure.

Mr. Chairman, would you like me to continue with just a brief overview on Grenada at this time, or wait until after General Gorman has concluded?

Chairman TOWER. Why don't we hear from General Gorman on the subject at hand and then if we could return to you to give us a brief overview on Grenada, that would be helpful.

General Gorman?

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL F. GORMAN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

General GORMAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like at the outset to share a few observations that I have gained from my personal perspectives of the Joint Chiefs and what we term the joint system.

As you know, I am both the CINC of Southern Command and former Assistant to the Chairman and I might add that I was the Assistant to the Chairman under both General Jones and General Vessey and my term of service spans the period in which the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has again become topical in both the public and congressional arena.

I would like to comment on the Unified Command plan which establishes our worldwide system of joint command which is the subject of today's hearing as well as my views on the JCS itself.

Taking the last first, the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has undergone at least 20 reviews in the last 39 years. Each review when judged on its own merits has provided good ideas.

More recently, Generals Jones and Meyer have advanced proposals and to their credit after service in the JCS, have decided to undertake another review of their own.

There is probably no aspect of military reform which has such persistent advocacy. Some reformers, however, have sought to alter the existing structure in the interest of augmenting the role of the Chairman or strengthening the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Such proposals or characterization of proposals, in my view, miss the fundamental principle which has been espoused by Generals Meyer and Jones and more recently by General Vessey. It is a principle consistent with the basic goal of every service reform since Admiral Mahan and Elihu Root and the turn of the century.

That principle is that it is the civilian Secretary, not military chief of staff, who is the intended beneficiary of the reform. Civilian control, as well as military effectiveness and efficiency, is better assured by virtue of a better advised Secretary, a Secretary advised by a competent body of military professionals.

Now, some have argued that the issue here is decentralization versus centralization, in which the latter is viewed as a positive evil. I would argue that these matters of national security deserve a better solution.

I have learned throughout some 38 years of military service to favor centralized planning and decentralized execution; the former as deliberate as possible, the latter swift, sure and as violent as necessary.

I would cite for your consideration the historical example of 1909 when Admiral Mahan and others were addressing the problems of reorganization of the Department of the Navy.

At that point Mahan held that a reorganization was required to insure that military continuity was provided for and that good advice was provided to the civilian Secretary of the Navy. He wrote President Roosevelt that:

In order to be ready for war, the Secretary of the Navy needed a full-time, knowledgeable military staff with mastery of all the Navy, domestic and foreign, that bore on naval policy. Such a body should be endowed with coherence and force by fixing on the head of that staff sole responsibility for the advice rendered to the Secretary.

As he put it, that head of staff should be solemnly charged that all he recommends he is sowing for a future, he, himself, may have to reap.

Further, Mahan argued, since the purpose of the military organization is to conduct war, the military staff should be taken entirely from that class to which belongs the conduct of war and upon whom will fall in war the responsibility for the use of the instruments and for the results of the measures which they recommend.

Hence, there should be a staff of naval officers to provide the Secretary a clear understanding and firm grasp of the leading military considerations possessed, which he may, without great difficulty, weigh the recommendations of his technical assistants and decide for himself and depend on him for technical execution of that which he approved.

In brief, Mahan was arguing that a better staff would help, not hinder, the Secretary to shed new light on technical issues.

Now, the National Security Act of 1947, as was amended in 1949, 1953, and 1958, establishes a Secretary of Defense with intra-departmental challenges not unlike those of the Secretary of the Navy in Roosevelt's era.

In some respects at least, the serving Secretary of Defense is in an even weaker position. After all, the Secretary of the Navy at the turn of the century had to contend only with eight semiautonomous bureaus in the Department of the Navy.

Today, the Secretary of Defense has to integrate military views from the JCS with the views from his civilian staff, three military departments, four services and a plethora of independent defense agencies.

I won't take time to detail the complexities of these arrangements because they have been well documented in the report of the Blue Ribbon Defense panel, the Steadman, and recent Brehm studies.

What I would stress is that the divisions within the Department of Defense today could be far more dysfunctional than were the divisions within the Department of the Navy at the turn of the century.

In my view, there is an absolute necessity that the Secretary of Defense receive a broad horizontal view of the military world from the joint perspective. If you look at the duties prescribed for the JCS in existing law, Title 10 U.S. Code, you will see it was intended that JCS do just that.

I believe that is the proper function of the JCS. I would hope that no changes to the law would alter that or weaken it. In fact, I believe it should be strengthened.

Of more proximate concern today is the worldwide joint command structure. Those of us in the military refer to this, as you have been told, as the Unified Command plan or UCP. The UCP is by law a matter for the President and the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the JCS to determine.

The military departments assign forces to the component command established under the UCP for stated missions and any force so as-

signed is under the full operational command of the designator or the commander in chief.

President Eisenhower, who of all the Presidents was in a position to know about such matters, stated in 1958 that separate ground, sea and air warfare are gone forever.

As Admiral McDonald has commented, the recent operation in Grenada is an excellent example of the cogency of that observation in 1983.

What should we seek in the Unified Command plan? I think we should at least seek to attain what President Eisenhower sought in his proposals for the reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1958.

At that time he said strategic planning must be unified. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must be provided professional military assistance required for efficient strategic planning and operational control, and supervision of the Secretary of Defense over military research and development must be strengthened.

The new weapon and other defense undertakings are so costly as to heavily burden our entire economy. We must achieve the other most military efficiency in order to generate maximum power from the resources we have available.

We have done much in recent years toward the achievement of those objectives, but I believe much more can be done.

From my perspective as a serving commander in chief, it seems to me that there are two messages from General Eisenhower's statements for us today.

First, the purpose of our Defense Department, of which the CINCs are the operating arms, is to insure the success of deterrence by being ready to fight. That implies being ready in peace for rapid transition to war.

Second, we must seek that effectiveness which comes from the integration of the service parts into the competent whole, the effectiveness of which is greater than the sum of the individual parts.

Now, effectiveness is a matter of readiness for joint and combined operations as both of my colleagues have testified. It is a function of training and of having joint command, control and communications prepared for such operation.

Effectiveness is also a matter of resources and resources are provided through the budgets of the military services. To obtain these resources the service components of the unified commands submit resource needs to their parent service for incorporation into the service program objective memoranda and budgets.

These resource needs compete within service channels and the allocation of resources is dependent on the funding level of the service budget and the priorities assigned to the particular program element and those program elements are not always handled within the services with the priority that we CINCs serving in the field would like to see.

I endorse General Rogers' statement on that problem.

Finally, effectiveness is a matter of ideas, call them concepts, requirements, doctrine. These are also peculiarly the province of each service which is charged with developing the service peculiar materiel and training, but the situation can arise, and has, in which joint con-

cepts, requirements, and ideas are slighted by services in discharging those responsibilities.

Clearly, then, there is some need for striking a balance between service needs and joint programs which are the concerns of the CINC.

The present Secretary of Defense and the present Chairman have both acted to improve the advice of the CINCs to assure force effectiveness, but in my view more might be done to strengthen the Joint Staff to act as advocates for the CINCs so that the JCS can more fully meet assigned responsibilities under the law.

The senior military advisers, the JCS, represent the joint warfare fighting needs of the CINC and are, in my view, best qualified, both from experience and position to provide that needed balance. They have the clout to discipline the service programs and they are directly interfaced with the Secretary and the President as advisers on force effectiveness.

I would suggest to you in your further inquiry the guidelines which were formulated some 74 years ago by President Theodore Roosevelt who wrote to this august body the following:

The requirement of war is the true standard of efficiency for an administrative military system. Success in war and victory in battle can be assured only by their constant preparedness and superior fighting efficiency which logically result from placing the control and responsibility in time of peace upon the same individuals and the same agencies that must control in time of war.

There would be no shock or change of method in expanding from a state of peace to a state of war. Now, this is not militarism. It is a simple business principle based upon the fact that success in war is the only return that the people in the nation can get from the investment of many billions in the building and maintenance of a great defense establishment.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Gorman.

Admiral McDonald, you can give us an update on the situation in Grenada at this time.

I am advised to remind you that we are in open session, so do not deal with classified matters.

Admiral MCDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The releases you are reading in the press this morning, relative to the war fighting being over, are basically correct.

We are in a mode now in Grenada and in the island to the north, Carriacou, of insuring that we have in fact located members of the People's Revolutionary Army [PRA], and have uncovered most of the arms caches that we believe to have been stored around the countryside or wherever they may have been located.

There has been no significant resistance for the last several days. In fact, this has been diminishing since the second day, Mr. Chairman.

The operation was, as I mentioned in my statement, a classic example of joint operations which basically any of the CINCs is prepared to do.

We went into Grenada, having planned to:

One, protect and/or evacuate American citizens, to provide stability for the area, and at the invitation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, to help establish a government which would be more democratic in nature than the existing government which had taken over rather rigorously and had placed the country into complete isolation for a period of 4 days.

On approximately October 20, while we were in the process of at least looking at Grenada, we decided to turn the carrier battle group, of which the *Independence* was the flagship, and the Marine Amphibious Ready Group which was enroute to Lebanon, southward in a mid-Atlantic transit to provide that type of alertness and responsiveness to protect our citizens and to provide potential for evacuating those citizens in a peaceful environment.

The planning was very compressed in that we actually started the significant planning, after the initial look, for a potential intervention in Grenada and commenced that on the Friday before the Tuesday morning intervention.

There was little time to plan in great detail, which I think reflected on the readiness of all the forces that participated. This has been well documented by the news and in unclassified information, which has included all of the armed services.

The landing took place predawn on the morning of the 25th; Tuesday morning a week ago. It was successfully executed with the U.S. Marine Amphibious Ready Group seizing Pearls Airfield on the northeast side of the island of Grenada in a helicopter assault and the U.S. Rangers securing Point Salines Airfield in the southwest tip of the island simultaneously.

Most of the fighting, most of the significantly heavy fighting, took place around the Point Salines Airfield, which was being constructed by a number of Cuban workers, approximately 600.

These were augmented by an unknown, yet to be fully efined, number of Cuban advisers, fully staffed to train these construction workers and to implement defense of that particular part of the area, which they did very well.

The first waves of the Ranger battalions going into Point Salines received antiaircraft fire as well as what was described by the commander on the scene as heavy small arms fire in the immediate area.

That fire was eventually and quickly quelled so that the Rangers could secure the airfield and the follow-on air flights by the Military Airlift Command were able to bring in the reinforcing troops and equipment.

During the first afternoon, we secured approximately 100-plus students at the True Blue Campus which is located almost at the end of that new runway.

One of our primary purposes was to get the American students who were attending the St. George's Medical School into protective custody as soon as we could.

We, unfortunately, could not get to the other students since there were basically two campuses and the other campus was located on the west coast in a place called Grand Anse, sort of in a separate campus located right on the beach and surrounded by a company of mixed Grenadians and Cuban troops.

We planned that evacuation operation very carefully so that we would not injure the students and executed that the next afternoon, successfully retrieving 224 of those students, totally unharmed.

From that time on, resistance began to crumble. The Marines had, in fact, performed another amphibious landing on the west side, just north of the capitol city of Grenada, St. George's, and when they came

ashore with some of their tanks and some of their tracked vehicles, resistance crumbled significantly.

The second day most of the major targets that we had determined through intelligence would be where the resistance was, had fallen.

From that time on, gentlemen, it was merely a matter of implementing a sort of sweeping and clearing operation, some of which was very difficult and took us 3 or 4 days.

In addition to that, we have been seeking out and have been fortunate in capturing the significant leadership of the People's Revolutionary Army, and have the leaders of the coup which ousted and killed Prime Minister Bishop.

We have been withdrawing forces since that period of time.

Today, the carrier battle group and the Marine Amphibious Ready Group have departed the area and are now enroute to the Mediterranean where the 22d MAU [Marine Amphibious Unit], which has embarked on Navy ships, will report to Lebanon and relieve the 24th MAU which is there at the present time.

The *Independence* will proceed into the Mediterranean and relieve one of the carriers, which she was scheduled to do basically on time.

We are continuing to assess what needs to be done and continuing to work with the Governor General of Grenada and with the Caribbean peacekeeping force. I did not mention this force earlier and I should have, as it is composed of approximately 350 troops and constabulary of the participating Eastern Caribbean nations who have played a role in this whole intervention. We will start withdrawing the 82d Airborne as soon as practical.

We have plans to do that, sir. The time schedule is classified at this time. Since this is open session, I will not discuss it. However, I will discuss it with you and members privately afterward.

I think in response to Senator Nunn's comment earlier, command and control was very much a consideration we had in mind when putting this operation together, sir.

We have a joint organization, in the Atlantic Command under commander, Joint Task Force 120, where he has Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine components reporting directly to him to operate in an island-type of environment.

So, we dusted off those plans. The commander of the 2d Fleet, who becomes commander of the Joint Task Force 120, and who is Vice Admiral Metcalf, by name, assumed command of the operation and effected the necessary liaison between the Army forces and Marine forces on the ground.

The concept used was one that has been executed in the past. When the Marines have either moved ashore or have moved to another area and the island, or the objective, has been secured, command of the land forces will move ashore to a commander ashore.

We are in the process of effecting that today, where command will shift ashore to a land commander who will then have the responsibility for the security of the island and helping work with the establishment of the new government, setting up the civil affairs, and then planning for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Admiral.

Gentlemen, I want to get into the command arrangements of the Unified Command. Perhaps this would be best illustrated with two current examples.

General Rogers, could you explain the chain of command from yourself to the Marine commander on the ground in Lebanon. Following that, would you, Admiral McDonald, do the same thing on the Grenada action.

We would like a detailed explanation of that chain of command.

General Rogers?

General ROGERS. Our chain of command goes from me as Commander in Chief of the European Command to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, to the 6th Fleet commander, to commander Task Force 61 and then to commander, Task Force——

Chairman TOWER. Will you yield at that point?

Are you bypassing Stuttgart here?

General ROGERS. No; I am Stuttgart.

Chairman TOWER. I see. I think, though, you ought to explain this more specifically.

General ROGERS. In my U.S. role, my headquarters is in Stuttgart where I have a four-star deputy, General Lawson.

Then the chain of command runs to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, who is also dual-hatted as Commander in Chief of Southern Region in Allied Command Europe.

He is located in Naples. He has under him his deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, located in London.

Then comes the 6th Fleet Commander afloat, Vice Admiral Martin.

Under him is Commodore Frank who has the Task Force 61 afloat and under him, CTF 62, commanded by Colonel Geraghty of the Marines, who commands the force ashore.

Chairman TOWER. I understand your being dual-hatted, but in fact a lot of your functions are exercised for you by General Lawson in Stuttgart; am I correct?

General ROGERS. My principal duty is Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, with my headquarters at SHAPE, Belgium. My U.S. functions are exercised for me within policy guidance and continual communications by General Lawson.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General.

Admiral McDonald?

Admiral MCDONALD. Mr. Chairman, my headquarters are in Norfolk, Va. I have direct access in the chain of command to the Commander of the Army Forces, Atlantic, Commander of the Air Force Forces, Atlantic, and, of course, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, which I am.

This last is the best of all relationships. He does what I tell him to do. In that organization when we go into a joint operation, such as this one, I have direct access to, and he reports directly to me, the commander of Joint Task Force 120.

So, during this Grenada operation, the commander of Joint Task Force 120 was directly reporting to me. I had constant communications with him in this whole operation.

He, in turn, had reporting to him the Army Task Force, the 82d Airborne battalions, Task Force 123, Task Force 124, which was the Marines and, really, the commander of the amphibious task force at sea and; of course, the marines when they moved ashore, had they stayed there, would have become Task Force 125.

So, there are very clear lines of command directly in the Grenada operation to the commander on the scene, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Let me ask both of you if you think this command and control arrangement is lengthy and cumbersome or does it function efficiently in your view?

General ROGERS. I think it functions efficiently and effectively and is not too long a chain of command. It goes from me to Bill Small to Ed Martin to the man just off the shore, the commodore who commands all those forces, both ashore and afloat, and then to the ground commander.

Admiral MCDONALD. In my case, sir, I support what General Rogers just reiterated. It is even more direct.

In this particular operation, it was from me to the commander on the scene. He in turn turned it over to his ground commander of the operation.

So, it is a direct link to the commander in this case.

Chairman TOWER. Until recently—perhaps it will happen again in the future, I don't know—the military had resorted to ad hoc command and control arrangements that I think to some extent bypassed the CINC's.

The Iranian rescue attempt, *Mayaguez* rescue effort and others in the past have not utilized the unified command structure.

In fact, a staffer, who is no longer on this committee, by the name of Bud McFarlane was critical in a staff report of the command arrangement during the Iranian rescue try.

Would you comment on the ad hoc command arrangements, and are they ever appropriate?

First General Rogers and then Admiral McDonald.

General ROGERS. Senator, I think it depends on the sensitivity of the operation. That one was extremely sensitive. The interest, I think, which was overriding was, in the secrecy associated with the sensitive nature of that operation relating to our hostages in Iran.

As a consequence, the planning and the operational control and the supervision of the execution of the operation remained here in the Washington area.

It could have been performed under the unified commander with the appropriate forces assigned to him and the appropriate intelligence made available to him, but it was decided not to do it that way.

Chairman TOWER. Do you have any comment on that, Admiral?

Admiral MCDONALD. No, sir, other than to add I was very comfortable in being able to plan and execute this operation directly with the people who were participating and at the CINC level. I think it worked very well.

There obviously was a heavy requirement for secrecy in this case because of the potential peril to American citizens being taken hostage. We wanted to be very careful of that.

May I go back and respond to another comment by Senator Nunn, which I did not address, and that was on intelligence and/or the lack of intelligence in planning that operation?

Chairman TOWER. That was going to be my next question, whether or not you had the right information available at the right time and the real timely intelligence to enable you to control that operation.

Admiral MCDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I think that operational military commanders never feel that we have enough intelligence to be

totally assured that the operation is planned right to the degree that you would like to have it.

Having said that, the intelligence that was available at Grenada was adequate in the initial planning phases. However, it proved to be not in depth enough to allow us to plan to the degree that we would have liked, but I do not see that as a necessary failing of our intelligence mechanism per se.

At the time we were looking at Grenada, we were looking at it from the very broad aspects of potential problems in the Caribbean area, the Eastern Caribbean area, and from which we would plan primarily an evacuation of American citizens probably in a peaceful environment.

When it escalated very quickly with the overthrow of the Bishop government and the imposition of martial law on the citizens with the potential danger to U.S. citizens, some of the elements of information that it would have been helpful to have, such as the number of antiaircraft weapons, or how strong the Cubans had, in fact, reinforced the island, would have been very helpful.

For that reason alone, and for that kind of lack of in-depth intelligence, we decided that we would take adequate force to insure the success of the operation.

I will be very honest with you, we looked at several plans, one with relative minimal force based on the information we had, but the uneasiness of not knowing the details required us to do it, and do it right using the force that is required to accomplish that.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Admiral, let me say that I am glad you did that. I think that was a wise course of action.

Chairman TOWER. I agree.

Senator NUNN. Always take enough force to do the job right. I don't think anybody would be criticized for taking too much force.

Chairman TOWER. It is better to err on the large size of force.

Senator NUNN. You mentioned land commanders now being set up.

Is that a normal situation to have no land commander, no one on the ground that has been charged with this type operation?

Admiral MCDONALD. I did not mean to imply that. There is a ground commander. In this particular case, there was a Marine ground commander who had responsibility for the northern half of the island. That arrangement was perturbated a little bit because of the 82d Airborne and the Rangers being sort of tied down around the Point Salines Airfield where most of the resistance was, so that we, in fact, brought the Marines around and put them into the west coast to help relieve some of the pressure in St. George's, the capitol city.

The 82d Airborne Commander, General Trobaugh, was in charge of the southern area. That is not unique at all with the overall commander, Vice Admiral Metcalf, being aboard the U.S.S. *Guam*.

Senator NUNN. Is that normal to have two commanders on the ground and the overall commander being at sea? Is that normal?

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir.

We generally do not put a ground commander in charge of the whole ground until the objective has been obtained. We use this, as I say, just out of our joint planning and procedures we have established in the past where once the objectives have been attained and you can with-

draw naval forces and other supporting forces, then you put the ground commander in charge of the overall operation.

That is what has taken place.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, you mentioned in your original comments the second group of students. You said you secured the first group very quickly, they were near the airfield, and the other group was more remote from the airfield. You said they were surrounded by Cubans and Grenadian forces.

Was there anything that would have prevented them from executing the students when the invasion began?

Admiral MCDONALD. No, sir, students were told to basically stay inside the hotel complex or the area they were residing in. The forces apparently knew that we were going to try to evacuate those young people and the Americans who were there.

The students seemed to be organized within their ranks, boarding up the windows and using mattresses and things like that to help prevent being hit by any kind of small arms fire.

But the Grenadians and Cubans could have taken those people hostage, had they so desired. I think the swiftness of the attack was such that they just did not do that.

Senator NUNN. There was never any attempt by the Cubans or the Grenadian forces to actually shoot the students or to take them hostage, but they were surrounding them; is that right?

Admiral MCDONALD. That is right. I am not aware of any attempt by them to take them.

Senator NUNN. How long were they surrounding those students? Were they there before you got there or did they surround them after the invasion started?

Admiral MCDONALD. We did not get to the school located at the beach away from the airfield until late in the afternoon of the first day.

The Army units that were going out there to try to secure the students ran into "determined or heavy resistance," so they pulled back from the area so as not to jeopardize the students without a plan of attack.

They then went about it the next day by using a combination of Army, Air Force, Navy tactical air and Marine helicopters to pull that evacuation off. It was a very rapid extraction.

We got them out of there, then we overran the positions once we got the students out.

Senator NUNN. For how long after the invasion started were the students actually subjected to being taken hostage or executed, and so forth, by the Cubans and Grenadians that were surrounding them?

For what period of time after we clearly were invading were they exposed?

Admiral MCDONALD. A little less than 36 hours. I would say about 33 hours.

Senator NUNN. No one ever went into the building or pointed guns at them? They were just outside; is that right?

Admiral MCDONALD. To my knowledge, that is correct.

Sentor NUNN. How many students were there in that group?

Admiral MCDONALD. 224 students were at Grand Anse.

Senator NUNN. Let me shift on that.

Mr. Chairman, as I said yesterday, I think there are a number of very important lessons that can be learned from this Grenadian operation. It would be most enlightening in our study of this whole area to look at the setup. I don't want to take time today.

We certainly can get the Admiral back later and go into more detail.

A broader question, Admiral, is when our National Command Authority decides to undertake a major operation such as the one in Grenada, are the CINCs consulted for their advice?

In other words, were you asked what you thought about the operation or were you told basically here is what we want you to do, now do it?

At what time did you come into the advice and planning on this?

Admiral MCDONALD. I got in on the planning when I was told to start planning for potential evacuation of American citizens from Grenada.

That then escalated to planning for intervention and my staff, along with the subordinate commands reporting to us, came up with a plan to intervene. That plan was then briefed to the Chiefs of Staff and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was then reviewed by the Secretary of Defense and then presented to the President.

Senator NUNN. Is that the way it should work or should the CINC have earlier input into the feasibility of the plan or was your input, from your point of view, adequate?

Did you get your point of view in before it was finalized?

Admiral MCDONALD. I am comfortable with that process as long as I have the military option to work the plan. I was afforded total opportunity to do this and to present it, having it reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff of the services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that we have the best plan.

Senator NUNN. On the intelligence question, what you are saying is, as I understand it, you would have liked better intelligence than you had, but given the short, compressed time frame and lack of focus by the intelligence community on Grenada, you feel the intelligence community did an adequate job?

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir, I think that sums it up, Senator Nunn.

If we had had a longer period of time, I am sure we could have obtained more significant detailed intelligence based on the essential elements of intelligence that we would have generated.

We just did not have the time to get someone in, looking and doing the other detailed intelligence. We didn't have time to do that.

Chairman TOWER. Would there have been some risk in taking that time?

Admiral MCDONALD. Absolutely; I think the events that have unfolded since the operation took place have revealed that, had we delayed longer in this operation, there would have been significantly more resistance that would have been encountered by the troops going in, as well as improved training of the Grenadians and the Cuban workers who were there.

Senator NUNN. This question may more appropriately be asked to people in the intelligence community, but for your view on it—I do not in any way say this was your responsibility, but when the President of the United States gets on television and shows the American public a picture of Cubans building an airfield and says it is for strategic purposes and the Caribbean is basically being looked on with great appetite by the Soviet Union and by the Cubans and that is a public statement with photographs, and so forth, would it not be logical for there to be a more intensive effort at intelligence-gathering as far as on-the-island activities?

Admiral MCDONALD. I think that took place. We have been focusing on Grenada since we have seen this 10,000-foot runway being built at Point Salines, which was obviously more than just an airport for tourism on that island.

I was there Sunday and I am not convinced that it is the panacea to Bermuda or other places that you and I may articulate or think of as the typical Caribbean paradise.

Tourism would not support the development of that 10,000-foot runway. So, I think that we were moving in those directions.

But I am talking more to the basics of how many Grenadians were armed, how well were they armed, how well were they trained, how much Cuban military tactics had been put in there in the form of trained advisers, how well armed were their workers.

We had rough estimates, but nothing concrete to go by. Given the period of time and our continued emphasis in the Caribbean, which I would ask General Gorman to make some comments on, I think the perspective of looking at Grenada was proper.

But to carry out a detailed intervention such as we did, I would have liked to have more.

General GORMAN. Senator Nunn, obviously, anytime an operation such as Admiral McDonald launched is contemplated, the need to collect additional intelligence is in tension with the need to act to forestall reinforcement, or to prevent reprisals such as hostage-taking, et cetera.

The need to inform the Congress and the public in order to develop support for the action is always in tension with the security of the forces, and the potential hazard to those forces of early disclosure.

I think there is no commander who is charged with planning for a contingency such as Admiral McDonald was directed to implement who is not concerned about these matters.

There are obviously throughout the Caribbean Basin a number of places where a situation such as we have seen in Grenada could develop, and a similar set of considerations be put before the President, the Secretary of Defense the JCS, and one or more of the unified commanders.

All of us try to anticipate these sorts of problems to the degree possible, but, as you know as well as anybody else in government, there are just not enough intelligence resources to go around. You try to anticipate as well as you can, but you are invariably wrong.

Senator NUNN. We have beefed up in the last 3 or 4 years and this committee has added manpower in that area. I think we need to beef it up even more.

Our technical intelligence is excellent, but I have serious questions about human intelligence.

General GORMAN. One final comment.

Particularly in these resource examinations—you can't do the job without human intelligence. You can look at the warehouses from the air, but you can't tell what is in the warehouses.

You can watch the runways being built, but you can't tell much about who is building them. You can watch the goings and comings through technical means of people on the island, but what their purposes were and how effective they were can only be ascertained by people on the island.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you.

Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Admiral McDonald, can you give us the casualties on both sides in the Grenada operation?

Admiral MCDONALD. I can tell you with a sense of confidence and accuracy of the figures that the U.S. casualties were 18 killed in action, 83 wounded in action and as of this morning, there were none missing in action.

Cuban casualties are more difficult to come by. We are estimating approximately 60 killed in action, but that is just an estimate right now, Senator.

The reason for the difficulty in coming to a firm figure is that some of those who were killed in action may have been buried on the scene at the time. Some of them may have withdrawn into the areas that we did not get to right away, wounded and/or killed, and buried there.

So, that figure is an estimate of about 60.

There are 659 detainees. They are incarcerated at Point Salines at the present time. Efforts for repatriation are ongoing at this time and, as the news covered yesterday, some of the wounded Cubans have been flown back to Havana.

Senator, that is not a full answer to your question, but it is the best that I have at my fingertips this morning.

Senator THURMOND. What about the Grenadians and the others from those countries who are participating?

Admiral MCDONALD. There were no members of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force who were wounded, certainly not killed in action, that I am aware of. There have been none killed in action.

There may have been a small number wounded in action, but we do not have a report on that. They have been primarily, Senator, acting as the guards for the Cubans at Point Salines.

They then moved into the city of St. George's as a very visible display of the coalition of the East Caribbean States and took part in some of the freeing of the city, but with very little combat taking place at that time.

They have now gone to Pearls Airfield. It has been secured and they will form the nucleus of the basic security forces on the island as we continue to develop civil government there.

Now, as far as Grenadians, members of the People's Revolutionary Army, the bad guys, we think there were about 17 of those killed in action, some wounded.

The problem with that is, Senator, that most of them were not uniformed. Those who were uniformed took their uniforms off, laid their weapons down, and walked back into the civilian population.

It is very difficult for us to come up with an estimate of wounded and killed in action for them. We do have lists of members of the PRA and, through the efforts of the loyal Grenadians, are identifying and apprehending these people as time goes on.

Senator THURMOND. Can you tell us how the 18 men were killed and others injured? Was it by rifle fire? Was it by Grenadians, or was it by strafing or just what?

Admiral MCDONALD. It was a combination of things that you would expect, sir, in a war that had blossomed into using significantly different types of weapons.

Most were injured or killed by small arms fire, rifle fire, or things such as that.

There were undoubtedly some casualties caused by rocket-propelled grenades which the Cubans and Grenadians had in their arsenal.

Some of it was the result of two helicopters in one instance crashing together, one of them having had the tail rotor shot away and placing that airplane out of control and it spun into another airplane in the military operation, and injured and killed several of our people.

Senator THURMOND. Can you tell us about the weapons captured? You need not go into detail because time is short.

Admiral MCDONALD. A significant number of weapons. General Vessey and I viewed four warehouses, one of which was almost filled. We were, in fact, pulling those weapons out of there, hopefully taking an inventory of them, which included basically everything from a few rifles of World War I vintage up through AK–47s in today's world.

There were boxes and boxes, stacks and stacks of ammunition for these weapons, most of them in boxes marked "Rice."

There was a full inventory of machine guns, some antiaircraft weapons, much bedding, uniforms, clothing, and much intelligence material that was collected out of this particular target area, which was a military camp.

There were more weapons there, Senator, than could possibly have been needed to arm a 1,000-man People's Revolutionary Army in Grenada.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

I read in the paper yesterday, I believe, that Castro was planning some retaliation.

Do you have any intelligence to indicate whether that is true and what retaliation?

Admiral MCDONALD. No, sir; I do not have intelligence that says that is true. Obviously, that was always the concern.

We increased our readiness in our bases throughout the Caribbean Basin area and we are at a higher alert to try to offset any of those threats. I think that would be the normal procedure.

Senator THURMOND. If Castro should try to retake Grenada, do you have any plans to prevent this?

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir.

From my standpoint as a military man, that is a nonstarter. I think he said that very well in one of his early press conferences. He neither has the capability to do that nor will we let that happen.

Senator THURMOND. Do you have any information about progress being made on reestablishing the Government there?

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir.

As you know, Governor General Scoon is the head of the Government. We are working through the ground commander to establish support in civil affairs.

The United States has an Ambassador-designate, Mr. Gillespie, who is there working with the Governor General as they try to form a coalition government in the area. We are totally supportive of those efforts.

That will take a little while, Senator, to get to the point of free elections, but there will be a government in being in the very near timeframe.

Senator THURMOND. Who is in control right now?

Admiral MCDONALD. The Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions for General Rogers and General Gorman, but I have to go to another meeting. If they will answer these for the record, I would appreciate it.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to address the subject of dual hatting.

General Rogers, you have two hats, the NATO hat and then commander in chief of the American forces in the European theater.

Admiral McDonald, you have the CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT responsibility.

Let us go back. The other day, General Rogers, I was asking questions about you as an overall commander of that theater in Lebanon, you were not able to go down there prior to the tragedy of the marines or thereafter.

You gave the reason that you felt that it might be injurious to your relationship with presumably the other military men in NATO and, indeed, maybe the countries themselves.

I accept that. Knowing you as I do, as being one of the most decorated and sensitive and compassionate officers ever to lead an Army in the history of our Armed Forces, I know it was a tough decision for you not to go.

Going back to this question of dual hats, should we reexamine it?

My recollection of history that we established at the time, it was almost inconceivable to think that the purpose of this Nation's utilization of Armed Forces in the European theater would be inimical to other members of NATO.

General ROGERS. Senator, it could be reexamined, but it should not be changed.

President Eisenhower, then General Eisenhower, was correct when upon being called out of retirement as president of Columbia University to be the first SACEUR, he said:

"I will if I can also command the U.S. forces that are in Europe."

That is appropriate because the primary duty, as I mentioned, the principal duty, is that of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe [SACEUR].

As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, it is known by the nations of the Alliance that I can do certain things with those U.S. forces in Europe as CINCEUR which I could not do if I were only the SACEUR. For example, the REFORGER package, "return of forces to Germany" package is assigned to me in time of peace.

As CINCEUR, to support SACEUR, I can ask for the return of those forces to Europe for deterrent purposes to Europe prior to action being taken in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The primary mission of U.S. European Command is to insure that it is fully supportive of Allied Command Europe. Being dual-hatted as commander in chief of the European Command, I can insure that what we do in my U.S. headquarters at Stuttgart and with the U.S. component commands is supportive of what needs to be done from my headquarters in SHAPE, Belgium.

I think it is key, it is critical and I don't think that should be changed.

Now it is in a little different context in which I placed it the other day. The European Command is broader than just Allied Command Europe, but, of course, includes all of Allied Command Europe.

It has been reduced recently with the Central Command being organized and being given a large part of the Middle East which used to come under U.S. European Command.

It is not the relationship with military personnel in non-NATO countries that concerns me. It is the political ramifications of my going to the Middle East where I am identified not as CINCEUR, but as SACEUR. I can assure you that the political authorities of NATO are not anxious to have any illusion being created that the SACEUR might be in the Middle East trying to expand the territory of Allied Command Europe.

Senator WARNER. Let us turn to Admiral McDonald.

You did feel free to go visit Grenada even though some of our NATO allies, notably Great Britain, had expressed opposition to what we were doing there.

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir, but I would offer, admitting that Grenada and basically all the eastern Caribbean nations and Cuba are outside the NATO sphere of influence, I have very visibly and, as have my predecessors, involved ourselves in the Caribbean States and in South America, which comes under my military responsibilities as USCINCLANT.

So, there isn't that perception that General Rogers might suffer from in his particular case that would be in fact transferred into the Caribbean States.

General Gorman and I work very closely together in the Central American zone right now, in Honduras, and anything else that should develop in that particular area. He, as the land commander, the overall commander, and myself as a supporting commander to him.

So, the precedent is already there, Senator Warner. It puts a little bit different complexion on the situation than that which General Rogers faces.

Senator WARNER. General Rogers, I may have cut you off. I did not mean to, if you want to finish your answer.

It seems to me you used the phrase "politically, it would be unwise" for you as NATO commander to be seen meddling around in that part of the world.

I am trying to dwell on the political problem of dual-hatting and what limitation there may be on our officers wearing dual hats.

General ROGERS. Senator, I have a separate headquarters in Stuttgart. I have a four-star deputy commander in chief who runs that headquarters and European Command on a daily basis. I give him complete authority to do that within policy and within guidance.

I don't think there is a day that goes by but that my deputy CINC and I are conversing on the secure line in order to insure that what is being done is what we believe should be done.

I just say to you that I offer you, as my best judgment, that there is no way that I can be identified other than as the SACEUR by those political authorities. We see it has become very evident as the United States has planned for operations in Southwest Asia that our European allies are very sensitive about expanding the area into which NATO as an organization might be pushed.

Senator WARNER. I appreciate that, General. I share your thinking. I think you did the right thing.

General ROGERS. I want to go back again and underscore what I said earlier, Senator.

This situation may be evaluated, but don't change it because it is very important. Eisenhower was right.

Senator WARNER. This does not mean to suggest I was contemplating changes. I have given a lot of thought to your answer the other day, and studying the parallel in the Navy situation, I wondered if there was, and I judge from what you say, Admiral, you don't think it is a parallel situation, therefore you don't feel, in your individual NATO role in relationship with other NATO officers, with a government who stated disaffection with our operations in Grenada, reluctance to go in?

Admiral MCDONALD. No, sir.

Another mitigating consideration would be that I also have a third hat which is Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. Of course, we are operating in that area in a fleet role extensively.

Senator WARNER. One last question before my time is up. That is the handling of the press relationships in connection with the Grenada operation.

Were you, Admiral McDonald, in that decision chain which made the decision to preclude the press from being present the first few days?

I am concerned about the absence of the press as a historical precedent in our country and recognizing that I think some 120-odd members of the press corps have been willing to accept the risk of military operation and, indeed, have paid the ultimate price in defending the first amendment.

Were you in that decision chain and what views did you express to your superiors?

Admiral MCDONALD. I am certainly in the chain. As overall commander, I am directly in that chain on these decisions.

Because of the concern for the students and the American citizens there, and what we perceived was the degree of secrecy needed, we

carefully guarded this from any kind of leaks. I think that became very obvious on the morning of the 25th when the major news networks really were unprepared to give a story other than the fact that there was a United States apparent attempt to evacuate citizens from Grenada.

Until we got the students out, I was terribly uncomfortable about having the press ashore, not from the standpoint of their own safety—I fully recognize they went ashore in many areas that were more heavily contested than Point Salines, and I would not at all question their dedication to pursuing the news even at the expense of their lives.

Senator WARNER. You attach a different significance to the life of an American civilian hostage than to the life of a serviceman engaged in the operation?

Admiral MCDONALD. I am not sure I understand your question.

Senator WARNER. I judge from your response the distinguishing feature of this operation which justified the rather unique handling of the press situation was predicated on the risk to potential American hostages?

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. My question is: Do you distinguish or attach a different priority to American potential hostage versus an American military man participating in that operation?

Admiral MCDONALD. We definitely look at that from the standpoint that the military man is trained to carry out the duties assigned in operations that are tasked to us. There is always that risk to those of us who serve in trying to do that.

I would say yes, we do place a higher requirement on evacuating successfully and without harm our citizens that are there, should it take, unfortunately as the case may be, the lives of some of the people who are participating in it.

But in the case of the news, as soon as the students were out, Senator, which was the second day, Wednesday afternoon the news was allowed in by pool or sent in by pool the very next morning, and we continued this and it is free now.

Senator WARNER. We are aware of the aftermath. We are trying to judge this policy situation. I guess my question, again, is that it was the presence of potential American hostages that you felt justified it and I presume you made that decision or were part of that decision-making?

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. And it was because of this that you and others determined not to avail the opportunity to the press to report on that military operation from the very first?

Admiral MCDONALD. That is correct, sir.

To be very candid, Senator Warner, I think this is one of the first things that has happened in recent history where it has not leaked.

As a matter of fact, I was very concerned about the leak when we turned the carrier battle group around and the MARG south that it had focused attention and certainly alerted the people on Grenada that there was a possibility of the United States taking some armed intervention, or at least being there, to protect American citizens.

Senator WARNER. Do you think there is no way we could have allowed the press to participate on a selected pool basis and also obtain the same security?

Admiral MCDONALD. In the time that was left to plan that, I doubt that.

However, that has to be looked at very carefully in future operations, I will add.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to probe further, but my time has run out.

Chairman TOWER. I want to depart from the views of my colleagues around the table and say that I think you did the right thing.

I don't see how in a surprise attack you can make advance arrangements for the press to be present. We didn't do it in the Iranian rescue mission, not in the *Mayaguez* case, and we didn't do it in Sontay.

I think if it is going to be a surprise, it is going to be a surprise or it is not. And, too, until you can fully organize the press effort, they can be a danger and an impediment to your military operation.

I think the way it was handled is probably the best way it could have been handled under the circumstances.

I think of a situation in which somebody in a Cessna airplane with a network television logo on the side of it could fly over the fleet or something, and it might be news people and it might not be. It may be somebody on a suicide mission who might wheel that plane around and dive into a ship, something like that.

You have to take certain precautions. For my part, I am not saying what you did is beyond criticism. It might have been that you could have gotten them in earlier than you did. I don't know; but I think certainly in an initial surprise attack there is ample precedent for not including the press in an operation of that sort.

Senator NUNN. Since I am one of those around the table who shares your view on the initial stages, I think it is not reasonable to expect the military to bring the press in at the very outset of an invasion that depends on secrecy for success and also depends on great secrecy for the safety and protection of the personnel involved.

That has to be the critical situation. I would reserve judgment at what stage the press should have been brought in. I lean toward the view they could have been brought in earlier because it is important for the military to understand that in the long term success in military operation depends on the support of the American people.

The American people have to be informed and they have to know they are being informed. I don't think most people in America expect to see television cameras hit the shore so that they can watch it on their evening news on the first stage of a secret invasion.

I would be disappointed if I got home and watched the beginning of a secret invasion on television. I would say, "What is going on here? Aren't we risking the lives of our personnel?"

To me it is a matter of judgment as to what the correct time was. I would have to reserve judgment on that until we go into it in detail.

Certainly, to repeat, I do not believe you should be expected, nor required, to inject press coverage at the early stages of a very classified secret military undertaking.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, if I might reply, I don't want to identify myself at this point in time with any particular viewpoint on this thing except concerning the timing.

You can't have the press looking over the planning stage of the operation. On the other hand, it might have been possible to have a wire service person located at a point where he could have at least participated in some reporting on the initial stages. Television, of course, requires a specific situation.

All I am suggesting is that we have to think through this more carefully.

Senator NUNN. I think it ought to be looked into. I think the military and the White House have to look into it.

Senator WARNER. Don't we have precedent for bringing the press in and secreting them in some manner with the understanding that nothing should be reported until a certain point in time?

Senator NUNN. There was press involved in the Normandy invasion. I don't know what the arrangements were.

There were also some arrangements made so that nothing could have possibly leaked out.

Chairman TOWER. There was great planning for that.

Senator NUNN. The question is: Are they willing to run into restrictions on their own against breaking the story in advance, that they entered into in World War II?

I think the media has to research that. As I see it, it is not whether there was press available during the Normandy invasion, but what did those press people agree to in terms of restricting their own advance word?

I would suspect if you look into the history books carefully, there were some pretty carefully constructed understandings and agreements.

Senator WARNER. I think that is correct. I think we should have a study of this as a committee because it comes within the scope of our responsibility.

Chairman TOWER. Of course, in World War II the press was operating under unusual wartime restrictions which don't apply in what is essentially a peacetime situation.

The United States has no Official Secret Act the way the British do, so that we have far less restraint on our press.

I would note further as a result of press reporting in the Falklands campaign, the fact that Argentine bombs were hitting the ships and not detonating, the Argentinians were able to make some corrections in altitude fusing which made them more effective.

I think the case can be made sometimes a commander has to balance the people's right to know against the right of his troops to be reasonably secure and safe.

Getting back to institutional issues here, within the Washington headquarters of the Department of Defense there is no organization structured to reflect major defense missions such as defense of Europe, defense of the Persian Gulf, détente, only at the Unified Command level do we see a maior mission orientation.

However, Unified Commands have a limited input in DOD decisionmaking particularly regarding resource allocations.

By contrast, resource allocations are most heavily influenced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the organization of the Joint Chiefs and military departments which are organized along functional lines, manpower, statistics, research and engineering, and so forth.

Should we have in Washington, and this goes to General Gorman's comment about need to balance service requirements against warfighting requirements at the scene, at least one organization to approach these issues of major mission orientation?

If I might flush that question out a little further, should this resource allocation process and your participation in the process be changed?

If so, how?

I might further suggest, should the Joint Staff be staffed along mission lines?

That is a pretty long question. I think you have the thrust of what I am getting at. I would like you to comment in turn on that.

General Rogers?

General ROGERS. I have to defer to General Gorman because of the inner workings of the Joint Staff as he viewed it just before he left it earlier this year.

As I recall, the Joint Staff is organized by area within each of the staff divisions. I think we have a NATO and a European area. We have a Middle East area, and so on.

I think that within each of the J–5 and J–2, and so on, there is that type of organization.

Whether or not having what you suggest would provide us with a greater input, I don't know. I just don't know, Senator. I haven't thought about it.

Chairman TOWER. Do you think your input is sufficient?

General ROGERS. I think if we were to take those five actions that I suggested, that it would insure that we have the cross-service input being raised to the appropriate levels.

It is also incumbent upon the CINCs not to just sit back on our hands and wait for something to happen. It is incumbent on us to know what is going on and to enter at the appropriate time into the programing and budgeting process.

I can assure you that some of us do just that. When we learn that action may be taken to eliminate from a program something which is extremely important to me as Allied Commander, Europe, I get on the net, either as CINCEUR or SACEUR, or both, to the appropriate personnel here in Washington to be sure they understand the importance that I ascribe to that which they are about to eliminate, and on the other side those things that are not included.

One must face the fact, however, Mr. Chairman, that the only one among those who sit around the table at the Defense Resources Board when it comes to that final day or two of tradeoffs in programs within the budget, and represents the voice of one CINC is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

I have told him before he goes into that session those things I wish for him to fight for.

Chairman TOWER. General Gorman, would you comment next and then Admiral McDonald.

General GORMAN. Sir, the most important recommendation that General Rogers has advanced, in my view, is liberalizing Joint Staff assignments. As you know, the Joint Staff in 1976 was reorganized. The buzz word at the time was "streamlined."

Whole functions were cut out of the staff. In my view, however useful those actions were in terms of cutting down overhead here in Washington, they did have the effect of making the Joint Staff less effective as an advocate for the views of the commanders in chief.

General Rogers is entirely correct, there is a cell within the Joint Staff whose duty is to represent my views to the JCS and to overwatch my generic interests in the several departments.

But in my case, that cell is a handful of officers, and they are simply not competent to address themselves to the entire range of my interests, or to manage effectively the intricacies of all of the departments and agencies with whom I have to interface to get my job done.

The second most important recommendation advanced by General Rogers, in my view, is to put the Chairman in the chain of command.

If I could respond to the Chairman, as commander instead of having to deal, as I do, with a whole range of defense agencies, each of whom consider themselves dealing with me for the Secretary, if all of that dealing had to be focused through the Chairman, and through the Joint Staff, my job would be greatly simplified and my voice, I believe, would be much more effective in Washington.

I concur completely with General Rogers that the Chairman can represent our views effectively at the resource table, but he would be more effective if he were regarded by the members of the Defense Resources Board or any of the other action groupings here in Washington as the principal voice, the sole voice, if you will, of the commanders in chief in Washington, and that is not now the case.

If I were to advise you on how to operate under present laws to ameliorate the situation for the CINCs, I would say strengthen the Joint Staff. If you want to know where to get the manpower to do that, take it out of the service staffs.

Senator NUNN. Could I have one brief followup before we go to Admiral McDonald?

General Gorman, you say you agree with General Rogers' five points?

General GORMAN. I would agree with four of them. I agree with liberalizing Joint Staff assignments.

I agree with putting the Chairman in the chain of command, and supervising the CINCs.

I agree that the Chairman should be a member of the National Security Council.

I am somewhat dubious about the idea of the deputy. I can think of many situations in which a full-time deputy would indeed have been valuable, but I would make another point for your consideration.

I was the assistant to the Chairman when the system of bringing in the members of the chiefs for a 3-month period of time was adopted. It was my duty to see to it that the incoming Acting Chairman was briefed and kept briefed during the period of time that he was serving as the deputy, if you will.

In other words, I was the bridge between the Chairman and his Acting Chairman.

I believe that that system which General Vessey and his colleagues adopted has had the great benefit of educating members of the JCS in the intricacies of the operations of the National Command Authority in the way that they would not otherwise have gotten, had they been left out of the net as it were in the former fashion.

It has made a very serious proposition of their getting themselves briefed and remaining briefed on world events day by day. They have to curtail their travel as members of the service chiefs. In brief, they have to really put their minds to the kinds of consideration that the Chairman has to bring on issues day to day.

I think that has made for a better set of chiefs. I would say that we ought to give this present system more of a shakedown.

Chairman TOWER. Admiral McDonald?

Admiral MCDONALD. I don't have much more to add, Mr. Chairman, based on the comments that my colleagues have made this morning.

In my opening comments I remarked that we are here in Washington participating in a review of the defense guidance with the Defense Resources Board.

In the guidance, very carefully articulated, is regional strategy guidance, regional policy guidance, which we parochially, if you will, look at how that guidance affects our individual commands and articulate that to the Defense Resources Board in ways that affect us, changes that we would like to see, priorities we would like to place or reemphasize, as the case may be.

The defense guidance also contains force planning and resource planning guidance. It is a close articulation between the unified commanders and the Defense Resources Board and the Secretary of Defense, of course, in doing this.

We do make our recommendations to that body and we do make our recommendations to the Chairman on frequent occasions, sir.

Of course, we have direct access to the Secretary of Defense.

I would agree with General Rogers and General Gorman that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be in the chain of command. In effect he is right now and in all practicality, we are working that way, it is just not codified.

Chairman TOWER. It pretty well depends on the administration, the Secretary primarily?

In other words, he has the flexibility to include the Chairman in the joint chain?

Admiral MCDONALD. That is my perception. I would defer to General Gorman since he has worked as assistant.

General GORMAN. This morning I had a go around with one of the heads of a Defense agency. That individual believes that he has authority to pick and choose among several applicants for a military command position inside of my command.

Now, I want to tell you, sir, since I rate that officer and he responds to me on a day-to-day basis for the prosecution of my business. I thought I was in charge of that. I was appalled to discover this other fellow did, too.

The fact of the matter is he is able to operate in that way without even informing the Chairman. When I remarked to the Chairman this morning that I was having this tiff, he, the Chairman, was surprised to discover that this fellow had this opinion.

We have a lot of sorting out to do.

Chairman TOWER. Let me ask one followup question and then I will yield to Senator Nunn.

Do you have sufficient authority to reallocate resources within your command?

You touched on the matter of personnel. Now, on the matter of resources, do you have what you consider to be adequate and sufficient authority to reallocate resources totally within your command?

General ROGERS. No, we do not.

Admiral MCDONALD. It is difficult, sir.

General GORMAN. I have less than either of these two.

Chairman TOWER. I think that is important.

Senator NUNN. Who does that?

General ROGERS. Forces are determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that are to be provided to the unified commander. The services then are charged with providing those forces.

When we have a ceiling placed on our manpower strength in Western Europe, we do have the capability of sitting down with component commanders and hammering out how each year we will trade off those units we want to bring into Europe which we feel are necessary as compared with some units already in theater which we will have to send back to the States.

Now, we are able to hammer out those exchanges, but that, too, is not easy.

But the services provide the forces and as far as reallocation of those forces, we have to go back through the Joint Chiefs' mechanism in order to do most of that.

Chairman TOWER. Admiral McDonald, do you have anything more to say on this?

Admiral MCDONALD. No, sir, I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. I have a few more questions.

General Rogers, on that latter point, you were a member, of course, of the Joint Chiefs and head of the Army and you are wearing a CINC hat.

On the question of allocation of resources, making decisions, who will be with you in the CINC command? Who is the proper person to do that?

Is the service making those selections, the correct one in your view?

General ROGERS. I want to be sure we are talking about the same thing.

If you are talking about senior members of a service who are to be assigned to EUCOM by his service, I am asked before those assignments are made. If I do not agree with the assignments, the service will insure that that individual is not assigned.

If it is the question of the allocation of forces and units——

Senator NUNN. That has to be by the service?

General ROGERS. That has to be by the service under the requirements laid out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator NUNN. You are saying you have veto power over the senior level people. If you don't like someone, they are going to send, whether it is Army, Navy or Air Force, you can say, "No, I don't want that individual."

Is that correct?

General ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. Does that work the same way with you, Admiral McDonald?

Admiral MCDONALD. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. General Gorman?

General GORMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. You mentioned this morning there is an individual who thinks he can put a particular individual in your command.

Is that an exception to the general rule?

General GORMAN. The defense agencies have acquired, in my view, altogether too much influence over these matters. Difficult as it is to deal with the military services within the joint system, dealing across to the Office of the Secretary of Defense is even more difficult and we have less influence to exercise.

The answer to your question is yes, this individual really thought he was in the business of deciding who could or could not be in my command.

Senator NUNN. He thought he could alter the rule that you just described about having veto over it?

General GORMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. You contend he cannot do that?

General GORMAN. I contend he should not be allowed to do that.

Senator NUNN. He can only do that if the Secretary of Defense backs him up and overrules you?

General GORMAN. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Do you think the present procedure in that respect—dividing it into two questions, one is senior command allocation of resources—do you think it works correctly?

Is that the way it should work?

General ROGERS. I believe it is correct.

Senator NUNN. You would not offer any changes?

General ROGERS. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. General Gorman?

General GORMAN. You may be aware one of the positions abolished in the reorganization in 1976 is that of J–1. Between 1976 and 1982 all personnel policies were handled either generically by the Chiefs as a body or by individual services.

With the reestablishment of the J–1, I think the Chiefs now have a staff proponent for matters relating to personnel policies including the selection of senior personnel and insuring that the needs of the CINCs are articulated to the services here in Washington.

I think that is an improvement. I would offer that to you as an example of the kind of business that the Joint Staff ought to be in on behalf of the CINCs. We need to have someone here to push our case.

Senator NUNN. Admiral McDonald, you did not hesitate in Grenada and we applaud you for that, but you seem to have hesitated on all five of General Rogers' points. You addressed one of them.

Do you want to tackle with boldness those other four or have you had enough battles?

Admiral McDonald. The only one I would take exception to is the Deputy and I only take exception to that from the standpoint of letting the system work as General Gorman has already articulated it is currently working.

I am not close enough—General Rogers has been there, General Gorman was most recently there—and I see from my perception, having the Acting Chairman working now for a 3-month period of time rather than on a week or a daily basis, based on seniority, is a step that, in my opinion, will work.

I would more or less second what General Gorman has said to let the system go ahead and flesh it out before we structure another layer with a deputy. Certainly the deputy, as General Rogers has articulated, has some merit in that.

That is the only issue I would have with the five points of General Rogers.

Senator Nunn. Otherwise, you would agree with the other four?

Admiral McDonald. Yes, sir.

General Gorman. Senator Nunn, if I can interject a comment, I will tell you how not to do it and that is the way we were doing it until the time General Vessey came into office.

I developed, as an assistant to the Chairman, a theory that crises were more likely to occur on football weekends in Washington when most of the members of the JCS were out of town. One such day we had three meetings in the White House with a different Chairman at each of the meetings. That is not a very effective way to provide advice to the President.

Senator Nunn. A little too much rotation?

General Gorman. Yes, sir.

General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add that having been a Chief, I think we need a deputy for the benefit of the Chiefs. It is very difficult for the Chief to continue to carry water on both shoulders as the Chairman and as the Service Chief because they are both full-time jobs. And then there is the matter of the cross-service advice that the deputy can provide.

My recommendation was for the benefit of the Chiefs more than for the benefit of anyone else.

I well remember an NSC meeting in which a Chief was representing the Chairman and it was directed that he, the Chief, never again attend an NSC meeting because he used that opportunity to inject into the system some matters which should not have been raised.

Senator Nunn. Could you mention his name?

General Rogers. I am not even going to mention the timeframe.

Senator Nunn. What was the title?

General Rogers. He was Acting Chairman attending an NSC meeting.

Senator Nunn. And was one of the Chiefs?

General Rogers. And was one of the Chiefs.

But remember that I have been associated with the Chief's office in one way or another since about 1958, so it is a long timespan.

Senator NUNN. I think you posed it sufficiently. You are saying that one of the Chiefs was sitting in for the Chairman and was in an NSC meeting and went beyond what the other Chiefs would have endorsed?

General ROGERS. It wasn't the Chiefs that said he shouldn't go back. It was the head of the NSC who said, "Don't ever let that Chief show up again."

Senator NUNN. Why was that?

General ROGERS. He just injected things into the meeting which were a little too far outside the scope of the meeting.

I probably should stop right there, Senator Nunn, and I think I shall, subject to your indulgence.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, is there any power you think you need as CINC that you now do not have?

Having looked at it from a different perspective, is there any power you advocate you be given either by law, regulation, or by practice, that you don't have?

General ROGERS. No, sir. I do not believe there is anything that I would request other than the five items I raised.

Senator NUNN. Admiral McDonald?

Admiral MCDONALD. I would defer to General Rogers. I have been a CINC now for only a year and it is very difficult for me to have the perspective that he does.

I feel very comfortable in being able to carry out my responsibilities with what I have.

Senator NUNN. General Gorman?

General GORMAN. I have to respond differently, Senator Nunn.

I preside over a Unified Command which has been in the process of being dissolved over the period since 1973. We have been engaged in a systematic withdrawal from Latin America.

My mission requires me to deal directly with the security assistance program as a principal instrument of policy, and with a range of other instruments which are somewhat unusual for other military commands to put reliance on them to the same degree as Southern Command does.

Therefore, I find a whole range of existing rules, regulations, and, indeed, laws which, in my view, make it difficult for me to discharge the responsibilities that the JCS have placed upon me.

I have made recommendations to the Chiefs that those be changed, and I am confident that my proposals will be carefully considered.

I also provided to the Kissinger Commission a set of recommendations for changes in the law, modest changes in the law, which I believe would make it easier for me to meet my responsibilities that have been assigned by the National Command Authority.

Senator NUNN. Will you supply a copy of that to the committee?

General GORMAN. I will be glad to do so, sir.

[Retained in committee files.]

Senator NUNN. That will be very helpful.

General Rogers, just for your information, I have already figured out who that Chief was.

Chairman TOWER. I have, too.

Senator NUNN. I know who the National Security Adviser was and I think I can guess the year, but I won't tell anybody.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, thank you very much for very useful testimony. We appreciate your being here today.

[The following questions submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond of the Armed Services Committee to be answered for the hearing record:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

ORGANIZATION OF UNIFIED COMMANDS AND RELATIONSHIP WITH DOD

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, you have served as the Chief of Staff of our Army and you now serve as one of the unified commanders. You have seen the problems from both sides. How would you alter the existing system if you had the authority to do so?

General ROGERS. First, let me relate what I see as the problem with the existing system. Then, I will give you a solution. In formulating military policy, strategy, capability requirements, and program/budget proposals, the balance between separate Service views and cross-Service (joint) views often is out of equilibrium—with Service views predominating due to the formalized role of the Service Chief and Service Secretary in the DOD decisionmaking process. Cross-Service (joint) views have a smaller constituency with a limited, formal avenue of expression. The Chairman, JCS, is the only Washington-based, uniformed spokesman for cross-Service views, combined arms requirements, and coalition warfighting. The CINCs, as combatant commanders and users of the military capability provided by the Services, speak from the cross-Service perspective. However, inclusion of the views of the CINCs in the DOD policy and budget-making process is not codified by law. In fact, the avenues by which a CINC can express his views are determined by the SECDEF.

Recently, improvements have been made which give the CINCs a more substantial role in the decisionmaking process—thereby achieving a more equitable balance between Service and cross-Service advice to the SECDEF. Note that the CINCs now make a number of appearances before the Defense Resources Board to give their assessment of proposed defense policy, strategy, military capability requirements, and defense spending levels. Additionally, CINC views on key issues and defense needs are regularly provided through personal correspondence with the SECDEF. Yet, these improvements, while working well and holding promise for better decision-making, are not formally codified. Different personalities or different working circumstances could result in the CINCs again being excluded from the decision-making process at a future date. Should this occur again, joint or combined views will not be considered fully in the DOD decision-making process—leading to disjointed strategy and gaps and duplication in military capability. Or worse, the SECDEF, in the absence of CINC views, would rely on his civilian staff to provide joint or cross-Service advice.

To preclude the above, and to insure that cross-Service, combined arms views are sufficiently represented in the DOD decisionmaking process, I believe the following actions are required:

(a) Place the CJCS in the chain of command to ensure that he is the peacetime spokesman for the CINCs on cross-Service issues regarding policy, strategy, and program and budget issues (this change also puts the CJCS where he belongs in time of war).

(b) Make the CJCS a full member of the NSC to insure that our national security arrangements are defined with cross-Service/coalition warfighting capabilities and needs in mind.

(c) Create a full-time Deputy Chairman to ensure the presence in Washington of a cross-Service spokesman. The current arrangement (of naming an acting chairman for three months) is an improvement over previous arrangement, but continues to place an overly demanding task on the Service Chiefs.

(d) Remove existing restrictions on the Joint Staff so that the CJCS has an adequate and appropriate staff to form cross-Service views.

(e) Codify the interface of the CINCs with the DRB to ensure that an equitable balance of unilateral and joint advice is provided to the SECDEF.

Senator THURMOND. General Gorman, you have served on the Joint Staff in Washington and now serve at the Southern Command. What are your views on changes in the existing system?

General GORMAN. I advocate strengthening the Joint Staff at the expense of the Service staffs, transferring to the Joint Staff personnel spaces to bolster its capabilities for operational and strategic planning (including politicio-military planning), for supporting the Chairman in his role as a DRB member, and for exerting joint influence on behalf of the CINCs and CJCS across OSD and the Defense agencies. I believe that the selection, training, and assignment-management of Joint Staff officers and commanders remain underemphasized by the Services, and that CJCS and OJCS should be given more clout in the military personnel systems to protect and enhance the joint system. I believe CJCS should be able to affect all promotions to 3- or 4-star joint or combined positions.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, you have subordinates who report back to their respective military services. What problems does this cause for you?

General ROGERS. It is correct that the USEUCOM component commanders do have a unilateral channel of communication to their respective Services. This is not a major problem. Recall that it is the Services that train, organize and equip those forces stationed in Europe and those in the CONUS which are earmarked for Europe. And it is the Services that defend their respective budgetary needs to the Congress. Thus it is necessary for the component commanders to be in close contact with their respective service. The Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) document, a JCS publication which sets forth the principles governing the activities of U.S. forces in the Unified Command, makes this communication appropriate. The relationship of the CINCEUR component commanders with their separate Services has been within the guidelines established in the UNAAF and has not been a problem.

Senator THURMOND. General Gorman you have subordinates who report back to their respective military Services. What problems does this cause for you?

General GORMAN. SOUTHCOM's components are weak advocates for US CINCSO within their respective services in that they are subordinates of major commands whose missions and interests are remote from Latin America. This causes problems on issues relating to tasking, augmentation for exercises or operations, force structure, unit equipment, installation planning, and service doctrine.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral McDonald, you have subordinates who report back to their respective military Services. What problems does this cause for you?

Admiral MCDONALD. The relationship between my Service components and their respective military departments is described in Title 10 USC, which in Section 124 states that:

"The military departments shall assign forces to combatant commands established under this section to perform the missions of those commands. A force so assigned is under the full operational command of the commander of the command to which it is assigned."

The same section states that:

". . . each military department is responsible for the administration of forces assigned by that department to combatant commands established under this section."

The distinction between the operational command of forces by the commander, in this case the Unified Commander, and the administration of forces by the military department is, in my view, quite clear. The relationship is further defined in the duties of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in Title 10, Sections 3034, 8034, 5081, and 5201 respectively. In each case the Service Chief's duty is to exercise supervision over members and organizations of the Service as directed or determined by the Service Secretary. "Such supervision shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the full operational command vested in unified or specified combatant commanders under section 124 of this Title."

I see no conflicts in this relationship. Basically, once the mission and force structure of my command have been determined by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments assign the force and assist in maintaining that force in a high state of combat readiness. Of course, resources are limited, so there must be a continuing dialogue between my components and their Services on requirements. The Unified Commanders can also, as I mentioned earlier, communicate directly with the Service Chiefs on uni-Service matters. I have experienced no problems with these relationships.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, the Department of the Army controls assignments of personnel to and from your commands. Do you believe the regimental system will decrease personnel turbulence?

General ROGERS. It is not clear that the regimental system will decrease the number of duty station changes that Army personnel typically incur; thus, personnel turbulence would not decrease. However, the regimental system will decrease the negative aspects of personnel turbulence by allowing Army personnel to project earlier and with higher assurance when and to where their next duty change will be.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, the Department of the Army controls assignments of personnel to and from your commands. Do you believe the regimental system will decrease personnel turbulence?

General GORMAN. SOUTHCOM has assigned only three infantry battalions affected by the new system. We are now examining with Department of the Army how the system will apply to Panama, and so I cannot at this time state with certainty whether personnel turbulence will be decreased. However, reduced turbulence is a goal both DA and SOUTHCOM are pursuing, so I am hopeful.

Chairman TOWER. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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